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This paper presents evidence that when an analyst makes an out-ofconsensus forecast of a company’s quarterly earnings that turns out to be
incorrect, she escalates her commitment to maintaining an out-ofconsensus view on the company. Relative to an analyst who was close to
the consensus, the out-of-consensus analyst adjusts her forecasts for the
current fiscal year’s earnings less in the direction of the quarterly earnings
surprise. On average, this type of updating behavior reduces forecasting
accuracy, so it does not seem to reflect superior private information.
Further empirical results suggest that analysts do not have financial
incentives to stand by extreme stock calls in the face of contradictory
evidence.
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I. Introduction
By synthesizing and interpreting data on publicly traded firms, sell-side stock
analysts act as information conduits in financial markets. Their opinions influence stock
prices (Brown, Foster, and Noreen (1985)) and may be viewed as “a natural upper bound
to the quality of the earnings forecasts of less sophisticated agents” (De Bondt and Thaler
(1990)). Observing analysts can provide some insight into the processes by which
financial market participants form their beliefs about the future prices of securities. To
better understand the factors that may lead to systematic errors in investors’ forecasts of
asset returns, a task that is particularly important in light of the recent financial crisis, it is
natural to study systematic biases in analysts’ decision-making. Previous research has
demonstrated that sell-side stock analysts display overconfidence (Hilary and Menzly
(2006); Friesen and Weller (2006)) as well as a tendency to make upwardly biased
forecasts (DeBondt and Thaler (1990)), to exhibit cognitive dissonance (Friesen and
Weller (2006)), and to overreact to positive information but underreact to negative
information (Easterwood and Nutt (1999)). In this paper we explore the possibility that
analysts are widely susceptible to another behavioral bias: the tendency to irrationally
escalate commitment to a previously selected course of action.
The psychology literature on “escalation bias” suggests that people often become
irrationally overcommitted to a previously selected course of action when they feel the
need to justify past decisions that have had bad outcomes (Staw (1976)) or when they feel
that they have already made large investments in past decisions (Arkes and Blumer
(1985)). We argue that if an analyst’s views on a firm differ dramatically from those of
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her peers, she may feel pressure to invest more time and energy than usual supporting her
opinion. Once an analyst has invested in such an opinion, escalation bias may make her
particularly reluctant to back down from that position, even in the presence of
contradictory information.
This paper presents evidence that analysts can indeed become committed to their
out-of-consensus views in a way that decreases their responsiveness to firms’ financial
disclosures. We document this pattern of stubbornness among extreme forecasters using
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) data from January 1990 to March 2008.
We find that when a company announces a quarterly earnings surprise relative to the
consensus (median) forecast, analysts whose forecasts differed meaningfully from
consensus in the wrong direction update their forecasts for subsequent quarters less in the
direction of the earnings surprise than analysts whose forecasts were closer to consensus,
controlling for analyst-firm fixed effects.
To illustrate this finding with an example, consider two analysts, A and B,
covering company XYZ. Imagine that analyst A has estimated that this company will
achieve earnings per share (EPS) of $1.10 for the first quarter of its fiscal year and $4.40
for the entire year, while analyst B has estimated that the same company will achieve
EPS of $1.00 for fiscal quarter one and $4.00 for the entire year.2 Analysts other than A
and B cover company XYZ, and the median EPS estimate for the company’s first fiscal
quarter is $1.00. Now imagine that XYZ’s earnings announcement for the quarter reveals
2

For ease of exposition, this example discusses earnings in units of dollars per share. However, throughout
our analysis, we scale all EPS variables by the firm’s stock price per share as of the end of the prior fiscal
year.
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that its actual first quarter EPS was $0.90, proving that the estimate of analyst A was off
in the wrong direction relative to consensus. On average, we find that the extreme
analyst (analyst A) adjusts her EPS estimate for the remaining quarters less in the
direction of the earnings surprise than the analyst with a forecast matching the consensus
(analyst B). For instance, analyst A might update her EPS estimate for the fiscal year to
$4.19 from $4.40, a change of just $0.01 to her forecast for the remaining quarters in the
direction of the earnings surprise after accounting for the mechanical incorporation of her
$0.20 miss of Q1 EPS, while analyst B might update her EPS estimate for the fiscal year
to $3.84 from $4.00, a change of $0.06 to her forecast for the remaining quarters in the
direction of the surprise after accounting for the mechanical incorporation of her $0.10
miss of Q1 EPS. See Figure 1 for a pictorial representation of this example.
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Figure 1. Pictorial Representation of Illustrative Example.2
Analysts other than A and B are not shown.
Two further features of the example are noteworthy. First, analyst A differs from
analyst B both in that analyst A is out of consensus and in that analyst A has a larger
forecast error for the first quarter. In our econometric analysis, however, we control for
differences in the sizes of quarterly forecast errors, allowing us to focus on how the
updating behavior of out-of-consensus analysts differs from that of analysts at consensus.
Second, as illustrated in the example, our predictions and results concern analysts whose
quarterly earnings forecasts deviate from the median quarterly forecast in the direction
opposite from announced quarterly earnings. We refer to analysts in this situation as
“incorrect out-of-consensus analysts” and refer to their forecasts as “incorrect out-ofconsensus forecasts.” We do not focus on analysts whose quarterly earnings forecasts
deviate from the median quarterly forecast in the same direction as announced quarterly
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earnings, since analysts in this situation have a strong rationale for stubbornly
maintaining their views on a company.
An analyst who issues an incorrect out-of-consensus quarterly EPS forecast for a
firm but who subsequently persists in maintaining her extreme view of the company may
appear to have high-quality information that her peers do not have. However, we find
that the type of escalation or stubbornness described above reduces the accuracy of
analysts’ forecasts, suggesting that our results are not driven by superior private
information. We document this reduction in forecast accuracy associated with stubborn
incorrect extremism by showing that analysts’ actual yearly EPS forecasts are less
accurate, on average, than hypothetical yearly EPS forecasts we construct.

These

hypothetical forecasts are the forecasts that incorrect extreme analysts would produce if
they updated their yearly earnings estimates in response to an earnings surprise like
analysts whose estimates matched the consensus. Indeed, we find evidence that incorrect
extreme analysts would be even more accurate if their forecast updates were more
responsive to earnings surprises than the forecast updates of analysts with consensus
estimates.
Of course, even in the face of contradictory evidence, an incorrect out-ofconsensus analyst may rationally choose to maintain her view on a company if there are
rewards associated with doing so. This is a potential explanation for analyst escalation.
Because analyst payoffs are not purely a function of forecast accuracy, incorrect out-ofconsensus analysts may persist in maintaining their views in order to demonstrate their
conviction and/or consistency. An analyst who frequently changes her mind about a
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company she covers may be perceived as lacking an understanding of the company. On
the other hand, an analyst who sticks to an out-of-consensus view may receive attention
from investors because of her unique perspective and may also be more credible the next
time she makes an out-of-consensus forecast. McKenzie and Amin (2002) find
experimental support for the possibility that forecasters who make extreme predictions
may be deemed more competent, even when they turn out to be incorrect. An analyst
who is considered more competent is probably better able to generate trading
commissions for her brokerage house and, in turn, increase her own compensation
(Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006)). Alternatively, if the rewards for making out-ofconsensus forecasts that turn out to be correct are sufficiently large relative to the costs of
making out-of-consensus forecasts that turn out to be incorrect, it may be in the best
interest of an analyst to “swing for the fences” by maintaining an out-of-consensus
forecast even in the face of contradictory evidence.
In this paper, we empirically explore the roles that the two broad explanations
described above – biases and incentives – may play in generating stubbornness. To do
this, we link our data on analyst forecasts to the list of analysts who were recognized as
members of Institutional Investor magazine’s “All-America Research Team” from 1998
to 2007. Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2008) show that receipt of an “All-America”
designation, which is determined by a survey of analysts’ clients, is a good predictor of
analyst compensation, so we use the designation as a measure of analyst rewards.
Controlling for factors such as past “All-America” designations, we find that earning a
higher level of Institutional Investor recognition is negatively correlated with a variable
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we construct to capture an analyst’s tendency to stubbornly stick to incorrect extreme
EPS forecasts. This suggests that incentives created by analysts’ clients punish the type
of escalation behavior we detect, and this is the case even after controlling for the average
accuracy of an analyst’s forecasts.
Our findings shed light on a source of systematic error in financial market
participants’ estimates of the future performance of publicly traded firms. In particular,
we document a pattern whereby market participants maintain inaccurate beliefs even in
the face of contradictory evidence. Thus, our work provides support for the
underpinnings of models that rely on disagreement among investors to explain asset
pricing anomalies.3 To the extent that our findings regarding incomplete updating by outof-consensus forecasters are indicative of a more general bias in investors’ updating
decisions, this research also suggests a mechanism by which asset prices may deviate
from fundamental values in a persistent fashion.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature on
escalation bias and analyst forecast updates. In Section III, we describe the construction
of our data set, and in Section IV, we present analyses that measure analyst stubbornness
as well as the impact of this stubbornness on analysts’ forecasting accuracy. Section V
discusses the factors that may drive analyst stubbornness, and Section VI concludes.

3

See Hong and Stein (2007) for a brief overview of this literature.
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II. Relevant Literature
A. Escalation Bias
This paper builds on a large prior literature examining escalation bias. Escalation
bias was first identified in a laboratory study by Barry Staw (1976) in which participants
were found to invest significantly more in an initiative that had performed poorly in the
past when they were responsible for starting the initiative than when someone else was
responsible for it. This differential was not present for initiatives with strong past
performance. Staw concluded that self-justification leads people to escalate commitment
to unsuccessful past decisions. In other words, individuals often find it easier to ignore
the negative results of their past choices than to admit their mistakes and move on.
Following up on Staw’s findings, Caldwell and O’Reilly (1982) determined that
after choosing a course of action, people will selectively filter future information both for
themselves and for others in a way that makes their chosen course appear wiser than
alternatives, a pattern that can lead to escalation of commitment. Arkes and Blumer
(1985) identified what they called the “sunk cost effect,” a term that describes people’s
tendency to increase their probability of continuing an endeavor the more time, money, or
effort they have invested in that endeavor in the past. According to this line of work,
escalation bias is a manifestation of the sunk cost effect: after investing in a course of
action, people will irrationally escalate their commitment to that course of action because
they focus on sunk costs.
In addition to the research mentioned above and many other laboratory
experiments, several studies of escalation bias have been conducted in field settings. In a
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paper published in 1988, F. David Schoorman found evidence of escalation bias among
supervisors in a large, public sector organization. He observed that supervisors who are
involved in a decision to hire or promote an employee and support that decision have a
tendency to evaluate the subsequent performance of the employee in question more
positively than others. Similarly, when supervisors participate in a hiring or promotion
decision and disagree with the eventual decision, they tend to evaluate the subsequent
performance of the employee in question more negatively than others.
In another field study of this phenomenon, Barry Staw and Ha Hoang (1995)
found evidence that National Basketball Association (NBA) teams suffer from escalation
bias. The authors observed that NBA teams escalate their commitment to players who
were higher draft picks. According to Staw and Hoang, after controlling for the
performance, injuries, trade status, and position of a given basketball player, the player’s
draft order still has a strong effect on his career length in the NBA, his playing time, and
the time before his team trades him.
Staw, Barsade and Koput (1997) found further evidence of escalation bias in the
field when they conducted a longitudinal study of bank executives and problematic loans
during the 1980s. In a sample of 132 California banks over a 9-year period, the authors
found that bank executive turnover predicted both provision for loan losses and the writeoff of bad loans but not vice versa.
This paper extends previous field studies of escalation bias by demonstrating that
this bias is persistent even among a group of individuals who are subjected to frequent
feedback and strong incentives discouraging irrational behavior. To the best of our
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knowledge, this paper also provides the first evidence that escalation bias may affect the
judgment of financial market participants, a group of decision-makers who are of
particular interest because of their collective ability, as demonstrated in the recent
financial crisis, to generate massive economic dislocation through erroneous forecasts of
future asset performance.
B. Analyst Updating
In addition to extending previous research on escalation bias, this paper builds
upon prior studies of how analysts update their earnings forecasts. Mendenhall (1991),
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Zitzewitz (2001), and Friesen and Weller (2006) find
that analysts generally fail to fully update their forecasts in response to earnings
announcements. Our contribution is to demonstrate that the tendency to underweight the
information contained in earnings announcements is particularly strong among incorrect
out-of-consensus stock analysts, who exhibit more stubbornness than others when it
comes to updating their predictions.
Zitzewitz (2001) and Bernhardt, Campello, and Kutsoati (2006) also find that the
best predictor of future extremism in analyst forecasts is past extremism. We extend
these results by showing that extremism persists when out-of-consensus analysts learn
that they have made an incorrect earnings forecast, and that this pattern is detrimental to
analysts’ accuracy and probability of receiving awards.
Our findings are also related to past research on analysts’ career concerns.
Theoretical work on “herding” has pointed out that decision-makers may rationally
disregard their own private information and imitate the decisions of others in order to
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protect their reputations in the labor market (Scharfstein and Stein (1990)).4 Consistent
with the theory, empirical evidence indicates that analysts do indeed herd, both in their
forecasts and in their investment recommendations (De Bondt and Forbes (1999);
Graham (1999); Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000); Welch (2000)).5 Because analysts
tend to herd, an analyst who deviates from the herd with an out-of-consensus prediction
may be acting on a strong private signal. Clement and Tse (2005) find that out-ofconsensus forecasts are in fact more accurate than other forecasts, and Jegadeesh and
Kim (2008) find that out-of-consensus recommendations receive stronger stock price
reactions. Like these authors, we examine the earnings estimates made by out-ofconsensus analysts, but we focus in particular on the estimates of incorrect out-ofconsensus forecasters. We address a question related to those investigated by Clement
and Tse and by Jegadeesh and Kim: when an analyst makes an out-of-consensus
prediction that initially proves incorrect (as judged by quarterly forecast accuracy), how
does she react? We document that analysts in this position update their subsequent
forecasts stubbornly and that this stubbornness reduces forecast accuracy.
Evidence has also been presented (Chen and Jiang (2005)) that analysts generally
overweight private information when updating their forecasts and that they do so more
when they are issuing favorable estimates relative to the consensus and less when they
are issuing unfavorable estimates relative to the consensus. Furthermore, these patterns
4

Trueman (1994) presents a model of herding that applies directly to the context of analyst forecasts. See
Graham (1999) as well. Herding is also a feature of models of informational cascades (Banerjee (1992);
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992)).
5
For related results, see Stickel (1990). Cote and Sanders (1997) provide experimental evidence of herding
in earnings forecasts. Research on herding in other contexts can be found in, for example, Chevalier and
Ellison (1999).
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are consistent with analyst rewards (Chen and Jiang (2005)). We demonstrate that
analyst escalation occurs when extreme analysts issue optimistic or pessimistic estimates
relative to consensus, and we find evidence that the type of stubbornness we detect is
inconsistent with analyst rewards.
III. Data
The data we use to conduct our analyses were obtained from the Institutional
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). I/B/E/S tracks the quarterly and yearly earnings per
share (EPS) forecasts for publicly traded companies that are published by thousands of
sell-side stock analysts around the world. In the analyses presented in this paper, we rely
on data from the I/B/E/S Detail Earnings Estimate History File for the period January
1990 to March 2008. We merge this data with stock price data from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) in order to scale all of the EPS variables in the
I/B/E/S data set by the inverse of their stock price as of the previous fiscal year’s end.
We drop all observations of “penny stocks” (stocks with prices of less than $1.00). In
addition, to obtain a meaningful measure of consensus, we require that a stock be covered
by at least three analysts in a given quarter to be included in our data set.6 Our final data
set includes estimates made by 6,202 analysts who cover a total of 3,513 unique firms
and work for 432 different brokerage houses. An average analyst in our data set
publishes 5.16 earnings forecast updates per year (standard deviation = 5.36) and remains
in our sample for 4.07 years (standard deviation = 3.38 years).

6

Note that 79% of observations in our data set involve stocks covered by more than three analysts.
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The I/B/E/S data allow us to track the forecasts made by a given analyst about a
given firm over time. We are interested in examining analysts’ last quarterly and yearly
EPS forecasts before a firm’s first, second, or third quarter earnings are announced, as
well as their first new, updated yearly EPS forecasts after each of those quarterly earnings
announcements. In total, we observe 130,499 paired sets of EPS estimates made by the
same analyst for the same firm before and after a first, second, or third quarter earnings
announcement.
We construct several variables to employ in our analyses of analyst stubbornness
(Appendix A provides a list of all variables discussed in this paper with mathematical
definitions and brief descriptions). First, we create the variable UPDATE to measure
how much an analyst updates her yearly EPS forecast in response to a firm’s
announcement of its actual earnings for the first, second or third quarter of that fiscal
year. Because our analyses examine both positive and negative earnings surprises
relative to the consensus earnings estimate (which we define as the median EPS estimate
across analysts covering a given stock), we define this variable in such a way that its
value is increasing as an analyst updates her estimate more in the direction of an earnings
surprise. Thus, when a quarter’s actual earnings exceed the consensus estimate,
UPDATE is the new yearly EPS estimate minus the old, and an increase to an analyst’s
yearly EPS estimate to accommodate a positive earnings shock is recorded as a positive
update. However, when a quarter’s actual earnings are less than or equal to the
consensus estimate, UPDATE is negative one times the new yearly EPS estimate minus
the old, so a reduction in an analyst’s yearly EPS estimate to accommodate a negative
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earnings shock is recorded as a positive update.7 Returning to the example in Figure 1,
UPDATE for analyst A would be equal to $0.21 divided by the firm’s per-share stock
price, and UPDATE for analyst B would be equal to $0.16 divided by the firm’s per-share
stock price.
We next construct a variable to measure how far off an analyst’s EPS estimate is
from a company’s actual, reported EPS for a given quarter: EPS_SURPRISE.
EPS_SURPRISE is defined to correspond to the sign convention adopted for UPDATE,
so it is the difference between a company’s actual EPS and an analyst’s quarterly EPS
forecast when actual earnings exceed the consensus estimate, and it is negative one times
this difference otherwise. This signing convention ensures that if EPS_SURPRISE and
UPDATE are both positive, an analyst updated her forecast of the fiscal year’s EPS in the
same direction as the earnings surprise relative to her own pre-announcement EPS
forecast for the quarter in question. Again returning to the example in Figure 1,
EPS_SURPRISE for analyst A would be equal to $0.20 divided by the firm’s per-share
stock price, and EPS_SURPRISE for analyst B would be equal to $0.10 divided by the
firm’s per-share stock price.
To measure the degree of an analyst’s extremism, we construct two variables.
The first, INCORRECT_DEV, measures an analyst’s degree of incorrect extremism,
which we define as the maximum of zero and the number of standard deviations
7

We acknowledge it is somewhat arbitrary that we group observations for which actual quarterly earnings
equal the consensus with observations for which actual quarterly earnings are less than the consensus when
defining UPDATE. However, we perform our analyses on a subsample of estimates for which actual
quarterly earnings are strictly greater than consensus and a subsample for which actual quarterly earnings
are strictly less than consensus, and our results are not driven by this aspect of the definition (see Tables III
and IV).
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separating the analyst’s estimate from consensus if the analyst’s estimate is off from
consensus in the wrong direction relative to the earnings surprise. The second,
CORRECT_DEV, measures an analyst’s degree of correct extremism, which we define as
the maximum of zero and the number of standard deviations separating the analyst’s
estimate from consensus if the analyst’s estimate is off from consensus in the right
direction relative to an earnings surprise. In the example in Figure 1, analyst A’s Q1
estimate deviates from the median Q1 estimate by $0.10 in the opposite direction from
reported Q1 earnings, so INCORRECT_DEV would be $0.10 divided by the standard
deviation of analysts’ Q1 estimates for firm XYZ, while CORRECT_DEV would be zero.
Because analyst B’s Q1 estimate exactly matches the median Q1 estimate, both
INCORRECT_DEV and CORRECT_DEV would be zero for analyst B. Note that some
previous research has quantified analyst extremism by calculating the absolute deviation
separating an analyst’s estimate from the consensus without standardizing this distance
(see, for example, Hilary and Menzly (2006) and Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000)).
The findings we present are robust to this alternative definition of analyst extremism, but
we believe our measure of analyst extremism is superior for our purposes, as it captures
how extreme a given analyst’s estimates are relative to the general dispersion of estimates
for a given stock.
To measure the accuracy of an analyst’s adjusted yearly EPS estimate, we create a
variable called ERROR. ERROR is defined as the absolute value of the difference
between an analyst’s new (stock-price-normalized) yearly EPS estimate following a first,
second, or third quarter earnings announcement and the actual (stock-price-normalized)
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yearly EPS announced by the company. For analyst A in the Figure 1 example, ERROR
would be equal to the absolute difference between the analyst’s adjusted yearly forecast
of $4.19 and the firm’s actual yearly EPS, divided by the firm’s per-share stock price as
of the end of the previous fiscal year. For analyst B, ERROR would be equal to the
absolute difference between $3.84 and the firm’s actual yearly EPS, divided by the firm’s
per-share stock price as of the end of the previous fiscal year.
These are the primary variables of interest in our analysis. If a variable that takes
on positive and negative values falls below the 1st or above the 99th percentile of its
distribution, we drop that observation from our data set. Similarly, if a variable that takes
on only non-negative values falls above the 99th percentile of its distribution, we drop that
observation from our data set. This trimming of the data set helps ensure that outliers do
not exert too much influence on our results. Summary statistics provided earlier in this
section were reported after the trimming of these outliers, and Table I presents additional
summary statistics from the trimmed data set. Note that typical earnings surprises and
earnings estimate updates are quite small.
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Table I
Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the stock-price adjusted variables created from our I/B/E/S data set, after outliers were removed (earnings variables are reported in units of dollars
of earnings per dollar of stock price).
Variable
UPDATE
EPS_SURPRISE
INCORRECT_DEV
CORRECT_DEV
ERROR

Mean
0.00226
0.00193
0.27834
0.29031
0.00642

All Surprises
Median Std. dev.
Q3
0.00087 0.00576 0.00300
0.00068 0.00469 0.00224
0.00000 0.51819 0.34314
0.00000 0.52522 0.38633
0.00166 0.02305 0.00523
(N=130,499)

Q1
0.00004
0.00010
0.00000
0.00000
0.00049

Mean
0.00123
0.00144
0.29644
0.31539
0.00469

Positive Surprises
Median Std. dev.
Q3
0.00067 0.00395 0.00214
0.00069 0.00369 0.00187
0.00000 0.52923 0.40976
0.00000 0.54683 0.46980
0.00142 0.01379 0.00428
(N=67,166)
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Q1
0.00003
0.00020
0.00000
0.00000
0.00043

Mean
0.00387
0.00301
0.32453
0.33034
0.00901

Negative Surprises
Median Std. dev.
Q3
0.00154 0.00745 0.00498
0.00114 0.00583 0.00364
0.00000 0.54672 0.49536
0.00000 0.53958 0.52223
0.00224 0.03178 0.00727
(N=50,481)

Q1
0.00023
0.00021
0.00000
0.00000
0.00065

IV. Are Analysts Stubborn to the Detriment of Their Accuracy?
Now that we have measures of how much analysts adjust their yearly earnings
forecasts in response to a quarterly earnings announcement, the extent to which analysts’
quarterly earnings estimates are incorrect, and the extent to which analysts are extremists,
we evaluate whether analysts who have made extreme, incorrect forecasts exhibit
stubbornness when they receive new information in the form of an earnings
announcement. We also evaluate how the updating behavior of analysts who have made
incorrect extreme forecasts affects their forecasting accuracy.
In our analyses, we explore whether our results hold for the periods before and
after the SEC’s 2002-2003 investigation of conflicts of interest in equity research, which
found that analysts were inappropriately influenced by the investment banking branches
of their firms. Because “Chinese walls” have since been erected within firms to prevent
analysts from communicating with investment bankers and to prevent analysts from
receiving compensation based on investment banking fees, the nature of analysts’
incentives has almost certainly changed, and we conduct separate analyses to make sure
that our results are not driven solely by one incentive regime or the other.
A. Evidence of Analyst Stubbornness
In this section, we ask whether analysts who have made incorrect extreme
forecasts relative to their peers covering the same firm update more or less than others in
response to an earnings surprise. To capture the relationship between an analyst’s
adjustment to her yearly earnings forecast and the surprise she receives in the form of an
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earnings announcement for a given quarter, we rely on the following ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression specification:
β1 EPS _ SURPRISE aft + β 2 INCORRECT _ DEVaft

UPDATE aft =

+ β 3 CORRECT _ DEVaft + β 4 INCORRECT _ DEVaft * EPS _ SURPRISE aft
+ β 5 CORRECT _ DEVaft * EPS _ SURPRISE aft + β 6 Q1t + β 7 Q 2 t + α af + ε aft

where a indexes analysts, f indexes firms, and t indexes the time period in question and
af

is an analyst-firm fixed effect.
To be included in these analyses, an analyst must have updated her estimate of a

firm’s quarterly EPS at some point in the year prior to the firm’s quarterly EPS
announcement, and an analyst must have updated her estimates of a firm’s future
quarterly earnings at some point during the quarter following the firm’s EPS
announcement.
Table II presents estimates from the OLS regression described above. Column (1)
presents these results when the full analyst-estimate data set is analyzed, while columns
(2) and (3) present the results using subsets of the data including only estimates made,
respectively, before and after the SEC’s 2002-2003 investigation into analyst conflicts of
interest. The coefficients presented in column (1) of Table II indicate that for every
additional ten basis points of the stock price separating an analyst’s EPS estimate for a
given company in a given quarter from that quarter’s actual EPS, an analyst updates her
earnings forecast for the company’s fiscal year by 5.7 more basis points of the stock price
in the direction of the earnings surprise. As predicted, we also find that the extent to
which an analyst adjusts her fiscal year earnings estimate in the direction of an earnings
surprise is decreased by the degree to which that analyst made an extreme estimate on the
- 20 -

wrong side of the estimate distribution relative to announced earnings. Specifically, if an
analyst’s quarterly estimate differs from the consensus by one standard deviation in the
opposite direction from reported earnings, when she experiences an additional ten basis
points of earnings surprise she will update her forecast of the company’s yearly earnings
in the direction of that surprise by 3.8 more basis points of the stock price.8 This
represents a reduction in responsiveness of approximately 33% relative to the 5.7 basis
point response of an analyst whose quarterly forecast was at consensus. Figure 2
illustrates this effect.
Table II
The Effect of Earnings Surprises on Extreme Earnings Forecasts
The adjustments that security analysts make to their forecasts of a company'
s earnings in a given fiscal year in response
to quarterly earnings surprises are tracked to examine whether extremists react less than others to a given surprise.
Standard errors are in parentheses; they are clustered by analyst-firm pair. All data are included in the regression
presented in column (1), while the regression presented in column (2) includes only pre-Chinese Wall data and the
regression in column (3) includes only post-Chinese Wall data. (*Significant at 10 percent level. **Significant at 5
percent level. *** Significant at 1 percent level.)
All Data
(1)
EPS_SURPRISE
INCORRECT_DEV x 10-3
CORRECT_DEV x 10

-3

EPS_SURPRISE x INCORRECT_DEV
EPS_SURPRISE x CORRECT_DEV
Quarter Effects
Analyst-Firm Fixed Effects
Observations
Analyst-Firm Pairs
R2
8

Pre-SEC
Investigation
(2)

Post-SEC
Investigation
(3)

0.573***

0.627***

(0.032)

(0.047)

0.540***
(0.057)

0.328***

0.370***

0.353**

(0.071)

(0.101)

(0.142)

0.297***

0.272***

0.304***

(0.050)

(0.069)

(0.096)

-0.194***

-0.203***

-0.200***

(0.026)

(0.039)

(0.049)

-0.063

-0.082

0.014

(0.040)

(0.053)

(0.076)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

130,499

80,811

37,572

46,841

28,978

18,415

0.556

0.567

0.667

Yes

From column (1) of Table II, (0.57)*(10 basis points) + (-0.19)*(1 std. dev. )*(10 basis points) = 3.8 basis
points.
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Figure 2. Pictorial Representation of Regression (1) Results
The significant negative coefficient on the interaction between the variables
INCORRECT_DEV and EPS_SURPRISE confirms our prediction that analysts who have
made more extreme incorrect earnings forecasts relative to their peers dig in their heels
and update less in the direction of an earnings surprise than analysts who have made less
extreme incorrect earnings forecasts. The regressions presented in columns (2) and (3)
demonstrate that our results are essentially the same if we restrict our analyses to the
periods before or after the SEC’s investigation into inappropriate relationships between
the investment banking and equity research divisions of finance firms.
Tables III and IV present the results of the same set of regressions as Table II but
include only the subset of observations that correspond to positive and negative earnings
- 22 -

surprises relative to the consensus (median) estimate, respectively. The OLS coefficient
estimates presented in these tables reveal that our main results from Table II hold whether
we look at positive or negative earnings surprises. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient
magnitudes for the interaction between INCORRECT_DEV and EPS_SURPRISE suggest
that the effect of incorrect extremism on stubbornness may be slightly larger in situations
where an analyst’s estimate is lower than consensus and a company announces a positive
earnings surprise than in situations where an analyst’s estimate is higher than consensus
and a company announces a negative earnings surprise. However, it is important to note
that the estimated coefficients on EPS_SURPRISE (not interacted) are larger in the
regressions analyzing positive earnings surprises than in the regressions analyzing
negative earnings surprises. In proportion to these estimated coefficients on
EPS_SURPRISE, the impact of incorrect extremism on stubbornness is roughly
comparable for positive and negative surprises.9

9

The coefficient on the interaction of EPS_SURPRISE and CORRECT_DEV is negative for the regressions
using the sample of positive earnings surprises (Table III), while the coefficient is positive for the
regressions using the sample of negative earnings surprises (Table IV). However, these results are difficult
to interpret because quarterly EPS forecasts with a nonzero value for CORRECT_DEV may be higher or
lower than reported quarterly EPS, making the sign of EPS_SURPRISE and therefore the sign of the
interaction term ambiguous.
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Table III
The Effect of Positive Earnings Surprises on Extreme Earnings Forecasts

The adjustments that security analysts make to their forecasts of a company'
s earnings in a given fiscal year in response to
positive quarterly earnings surprises are tracked to examine whether extremists react less than others to a given surprise.
Standard errors are in parentheses; they are clustered by analyst-firm pair. Standard errors are in parentheses; they are
clustered by analyst-firm pair. All data on positive surprises are included in the regression presented in column (4), while
the regression presented in column (5) includes only pre-Chinese Wall data and the regression in column (6) includes only
post-Chinese Wall data. (*Significant at 10 percent level. **Significant at 5 percent level. *** Significant at 1 percent
level.)
Pre-SEC
Post-SEC
All Data
Investigation
Investigation
EPS_SURPRISE
INCORRECT_DEV x 10

-3

CORRECT_DEV x 10-3
EPS_SURPRISE x INCORRECT_DEV
EPS_SURPRISE x CORRECT_DEV
Quarter Effects
Analyst-Firm Fixed Effects
Observations
Analyst-Firm Pairs
R2
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(4)

(5)

0.818***

0.874***

0.696***

(6)

(0.039)

(0.055)

(0.078)

0.347***

0.355***

0.342**

(0.063)

(0.069)

(0.167)

0.377***

0.324***

0.330***

(0.053)

(0.071)

(0.118)

-0.292***

-0.286***

-0.266***

(0.031)

(0.041)

(0.068)

-0.320***

-0.377***

-0.077

(0.052)

(0.069)

(0.088)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

67,166

39,216

21,704

31,777

18,738

12,861

0.646

0.648

0.751

Yes

Table IV
The Effect of Negative Earnings Surprises on Extreme Earnings Forecasts

The adjustments that security analysts make to their forecasts of a company'
s earnings in a given fiscal year in response to
negative quarterly earnings surprises are tracked to examine whether extremists react less than others to a given surprise.
Standard errors are in parentheses; they are clustered by analyst-firm pair. Standard errors are in parentheses; they are
clustered by analyst-firm pair. All data on negative surprises are included in the regression presented in column (7), while
the regression presented in column (8) includes only pre-Chinese Wall data and the regression in column (9) includes only
post-Chinese Wall data. (*Significant at 10 percent level. **Significant at 5 percent level. *** Significant at 1 percent
level.)
Pre-SEC
Post-SEC
All Data
Investigation
Investigation
(7)
(8)
(9)
0.522***
0.572***
0.437***
EPS_SURPRISE
(0.042)

(0.051)

(0.129)

0.465***

0.568***

-0.231

(0.165)

(0.204)

(0.456)

0.412***

0.392***

0.148

(0.127)

(0.148)

(0.382)

EPS_SURPRISE x INCORRECT_DEV

-0.204***

-0.219***

-0.110

(0.037)

(0.046)

(0.102)

EPS_SURPRISE x CORRECT_DEV

0.072

0.044

0.055

(0.071)

(0.088)

(0.203)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

50,481

34,132

11,888

27,508

17,745

8,762

0.696

0.695

0.823

INCORRECT_DEV x 10-3
CORRECT_DEV x 10

-3

Quarter Effects
Analyst-Firm Fixed Effects
Observations
Analyst-Firm Pairs
R2

Yes

If we run the analyses discussed above without including analyst-firm fixed
effects or without multiplying our EPS variables by the inverse of a firm’s stock price,
our results remain essentially the same in magnitude, and their statistical significance
does not change. Dropping observations in our data set involving quarterly forecasts that
were not revised within 90, 30 or 15 days of the end date of the quarter in question also
does not change any of our results meaningfully. Nor do our primary results change
meaningfully if we re-run our analyses separately for first quarter, second quarter, and
third quarter earnings surprises. Finally, an analysis of the impact of an analyst’s
experience on escalation suggests that there is no significant relationship between an
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analyst’s years of experience forecasting and her tendency to exhibit the type of
stubbornness uncovered in this paper.10
B. Evidence that Stubbornness Harms Accuracy
The next question we investigate is whether the type of stubbornness we detect
among analysts who have made extreme EPS forecasts is harmful or helpful to their
forecasting accuracy. It seems plausible that analysts who make more extreme estimates
and update less in response to earnings announcements could have some private
information that leads updating their forecasts in this way to improve their accuracy. In
order to investigate this possibility, we compare the effectiveness of analysts’ actual
updating strategies with the effectiveness of a hypothetical updating strategy in which we
eliminate the degree of stubbornness observed in our above regression analyses. For these
analyses, we rely on the variable ERROR (described in Section III), which measures the
distance between an analyst’s updated yearly forecast following a quarterly earnings
announcement and the actual yearly earnings a company reported. We also create a
hypothetical measure of an analyst’s accuracy in a world without stubbornness:
HYP_ERROR (see Appendix A). To generate this hypothetical accuracy value, we
calculate the product of an analyst’s degree of incorrect extremeness
(INCORRECT_DEV) and his EPS surprise (EPS_SURPRISE) for a given quarter and
multiply this product by the coefficient on the interaction term between these variables in
column (1) of Table II (

4

from our regression equation). This “average stubbornness”

quantity is then removed from an analyst’s actual yearly forecast by subtracting the
10

The full results from all robustness tests reported are available upon request from the authors.
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quantity from the yearly forecast when reported quarterly EPS is above the consensus
estimate and adding the quantity to the yearly forecast otherwise (to conform to the sign
conventions for UPDATE).
For all of the observations of EPS estimate updates included in the regression
presented in column (1) of Table II, we then conduct a paired t-test to examine whether
the mean accuracy of analysts’ actual forecasts or hypothetical forecasts is higher. We
find that hypothetical forecasts from which analysts’ stubbornness has been excised
would be significantly more accurate than analysts’ actual EPS forecasts (two sample
paired t-test, p-value < .001). Thus, it appears that analysts who have made incorrect
extreme earnings forecasts about a given company exhibit stubbornness in updating their
opinions that is harmful to their forecasting accuracy.
When constructing hypothetical forecasts to demonstrate that analysts exhibiting
no stubbornness would be more accurate on average than actual analysts, our calculations
started with analysts’ actual forecasts and adjusted them such that

4,

the coefficient on

the interaction of INCORRECT_DEV and EPS_SURPRISE, was zero instead of the
estimated -0.19 from column (1) of Table II. Using the same framework, we can also ask
what value of

4

would maximize accuracy (or minimize ERROR), on average, among

analysts in our sample. In other words, holding all other components of our regression
model fixed, we can answer the question: how should incorrect, out-of-consensus
analysts respond to an earnings surprise in order to optimize their average accuracy? In
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the sample used in column (1) of Table II, a

4

value of 0.03 (standard error 0.01)11

would produce the largest reduction in mean error over actual forecasts, where error is
measured as the absolute difference between forecasted and reported earnings (see Figure
2). This result suggests that analysts with incorrect extreme forecasts could improve their
accuracy if they were more instead of less responsive to earnings surprises than analysts
with forecasts closer to consensus.

11

The standard error is calculated as follows. We construct one thousand bootstrap samples by randomly
drawing 10% subsamples with replacement from the sample of analysts used in column (1) of Table II. For
each of these bootstrap samples, we determine the value of 4 that gives the largest improvement in mean
accuracy. The standard error is the standard deviation of these 4 coefficients across bootstrap samples,
multiplied by the square root of 0.1 to adjust for the size of the bootstrap samples relative to the full
sample.
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Figure 2. The Effect of Simulated Changes in the Degree of
Stubbornness on Average Forecast Error
Plot of yearly forecast error against hypothetical coefficient values for the
interaction of INCORRECT_DEV and EPS_SURPRISE. Adopting the
sample and coefficient estimates from column (1) of Table II, we use the
regression equation presented in Section IV.A to simulate yearly forecast
updates by holding all components of this equation fixed except for 4,
which we vary from -0.3 to 0.3. The mean absolute yearly forecast error
implied by these simulated updates is plotted against the coefficient 4.
V. Discussion
The analyses presented above indicate that out-of-consensus analysts who have
made incorrect forecasts update less than others in response to equivalent earnings
surprises and that this behavior is harmful to their accuracy. As discussed previously,
there are a number of potential explanations for these findings. One potential reason for
the stubbornness we detect in analysts is that they are suboptimal decision makers who
are prone to systematic error. Analysts may, for example, become overcommitted to their
previously published out-of-consensus opinions and fail to update appropriately in
- 29 -

response to new, contradictory information - a pattern of behavior that has been detected
in previous research on escalation bias (Staw (1976); Arkes and Blumer (1985)). Or,
analysts may become so focused on their private information regarding a firm that they
overweight it relative to public information, making them reluctant to update their
forecasts in response to earnings surprises. Incorrect out-of-consensus analysts might
also anchor too strongly on their previous earnings estimates (Tversky and Kahneman
(1974)), leading them to be less responsive to the information contained in new earnings
announcements. Alternatively, they may underweight the value of attending carefully to
earnings updates.
Another potential explanation for our findings about analysts’ updating behavior
is that analysts are rewarded for sticking doggedly with their incorrect estimates.
Because analysts are paid not only based on the accuracy of their forecasts but also based
on the ratings they receive from clients and the trading commissions they generate for
their employers (Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006); Groysberg, Healy, and Maber
(2008)), they may have an incentive to demonstrate the conviction of their views even
when this is harmful to their accuracy. Previous theoretical work has suggested that it
may be a wise strategy for low ability analysts to issue extreme earnings forecasts and
under-update in response to new information in order to imitate high ability analysts
(Prendergast and Stole (1996); Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996)).
In order to explore which of the above explanations is most plausible, we examine
whether analysts seem to be rewarded or punished by clients for stubbornly maintaining
incorrect extreme earnings forecasts. To investigate this question, we gather data on the

- 30 -

approximately 380 analysts who were named “All-Americans” each year by Institutional
Investor (II) magazine, an honor that has been associated with increased pay (Cowen,
Groysberg, and Healy (2008)) and that is based on client reviews rather than analysts’
accuracy. We merge our I/B/E/S estimates data with a list of the analysts who were
named first team, second team, third team or runner-up II “All-Americans” each year
between 1998 and 2007. We then construct an analyst-year data set including variables
that capture an analyst’s average degree of incorrect extremism, average degree of
correct extremism, average degree of incorrect stubbornness, and average degree of
correct stubbornness during the twelve months leading up to the announcement of the
“All-America” analyst team. For details on the creation of this data set, see Appendix
B.12,13
To examine the factors that contribute to an analyst’s likelihood of receiving
different levels of II “All-America” recognition, we perform ordered logit regressions
where the award received by an analyst in a given year is the outcome variable (4 = first
team, 3 = second team, 2 = third team, 1 = runner-up, 0 = no award). Our primary
explanatory variable, %INCORRECT_STUB, captures the degree of stubbornness
12

Note that before 2007, it was possible to obtain an I/B/E/S translation file from Thomson (the owner of
the data) to de-anonymize brokerage house and analyst ID’s. However, Thomson no longer makes this file
available and actually requested that those previously in possession of the file destroy it. For a period,
Thomson would grant individual researchers access to the translation file, but they have stopped granting
such requests, which is why we were required to find an alternate way to translate the data (see Appendix
B). Our translation method did not allow us to identify all analysts in our data set, and those analysts who
could not be identified were, by necessity, dropped from the analyses in this section.
Our procedure for linking I/B/E/S data to information on II “All-American” status only produced
matches for a subset of brokerage houses. When we perform the analyses presented in Section IV on this
subsample, our results do not change meaningfully.
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exhibited by an analyst when she was incorrect during the year leading up to the awards’
announcement. It is defined as the fraction of quarterly earnings forecasts issued by the
analyst during the year that satisfy two criteria: (i) the quarterly forecast differed from
the consensus forecast in the direction opposite from reported earnings per share; and (ii)
the analyst adjusted her forecast for the remaining quarters of the fiscal year by less in the
direction of the earnings surprise than a hypothetical benchmark. The benchmark is
constructed as follows. We perform the regression presented in column (1) of Table II
using the subset of analysts who are included in the data set that merges information from
I/B/E/S and II “All-America” lists. We use the coefficient estimates from this regression
to predict the value of the variable UPDATE according to the regression equation
presented in Section IV.A, except we set the coefficients on the two interaction terms (
and

5)

4

to zero. These adjusted predicted values serve as the benchmark, and they are

intended to capture the way a typical analyst at consensus (with no need to stubbornly
stick by an incorrect out-of-consensus forecast) would update her yearly forecast in
response to a quarterly earnings surprise. If an analyst updates a forecast by less in the
direction of the earnings surprise than this hypothetical benchmark, we deem the analyst
to be acting stubbornly. For symmetry, we also construct a second stubbornness variable,
%CORRECT_STUB. This variable is defined as the fraction of quarterly earnings
forecasts issued by the analyst during the year that satisfy two criteria: (i) the quarterly
forecast differed from the consensus forecast in the same direction as reported earnings
per share; and (ii) the analyst adjusted her forecast for the remaining quarters of the fiscal
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year by less in the direction of the earnings surprise than the hypothetical benchmark
explained above (see Appendix B for summary statistics for these variables).
In Table V, column (10) reports the results of an ordered logit regression
predicting the level of “All-American” honor an analyst receives in a given year with
%INCORRECT_STUB and %CORRECT_STUB on the right-hand side.14 In addition, the
right-hand side of regression (10) includes dummy variables indicating which “AllAmerican” designation an analyst received the previous year.15 This information on past
honors helps us control for an analyst’s reputation. The positive coefficient on
%CORRECT_STUB is not surprising. If an analyst’s quarterly forecast deviates from the
consensus in the direction that turns out to be correct, it seems logical for her to update
her forecasts less than her peers, and her clients may reward her for presenting and
maintaining an accurate out-of-consensus view of the firm. The negative and statistically
significant coefficient on %INCORRECT_STUB, on the other hand, suggests that analysts
are punished for sticking to views that initially prove to be incorrect. According to these
regression results, an analyst who had not received an “All-American” designation
previously and who had values of %INCORRECT_STUB and %CORRECT_STUB at
their sample means would have a predicted probability of 4.0% of being recognized as an

14

Because %INCORRECT_STUB and %CORRECT_STUB are constructed using estimated parameters, the
standard errors reported in Table V are calculated as follows. We create one thousand bootstrap samples
by randomly drawing 20% subsamples with replacement from the sample of analysts used in Table V. For
each of these bootstrap samples, we conduct the regression procedure for obtaining hypothetical
benchmarks, recalculate the variables that rely on these benchmarks, perform the ordered logit regressions
in Table V, and collect the coefficient estimates from those regressions. The standard error for a given
coefficient is the standard deviation of that coefficient across bootstrap samples, multiplied by the square
root of 0.2 to adjust for the size of the bootstrap samples relative to the full sample.
15
When information on whether the analyst received an “All-American” designation was unavailable for
the prior year, we used the next most recent year for which information was available.
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“All-American” runner-up or better, and an increase in the %INCORRECT_STUB
variable of one standard deviation would decrease that probability by 0.3 percentage
points. Thus, it does not seem that incorrect out-of-consensus analysts are rewarded for
the type of stubbornness we detect in Section IV.
Table V
The Effect of Stubbornness on an Analyst's Probability of Winning an Institutional Investor Award
The analysts who receive Institutional Investor "All-American" status in a given year are tracked to examine whether
extremists who are proven incorrect in their estimates by an earnings surpise and who react stubbornly to that surprise
are more or less likely to receive such an honor. Below are the results of ordered logit regression analyses where the
outcome categories are "no award," "runner up," "third team," "second team," and "first team." Bootstrapped standard
errors, calculated using the method described in the text, are in parentheses. (*Significant at 10 percent level.
**Significant at 5 percent level. *** Significant at 1 percent level.)
%INCORRECT_STUB
%CORRECT_STUB

(10)

(11)

-0.323**

-0.796***

(0.146)

(0.218)

0.331**

0.352*

(0.145)

%INCORRECT_DEV
%CORRECT_DEV
AVG_ERROR

(12)

0.352*

(0.187)

(0.187)

0.583***

0.583***

(0.180)

(0.180)

0.084

0.084

(0.144)

(0.144)

-8.664*

-8.672*

(5.122)

(5.132)

%INCORRECT_STUB_SUC

-0.801***

%INCORRECT_STUB_FAIL

-0.792***

(0.257)
(0.248)

Indicator Variables for Ranking Achieved in Previous Year
Observations
Log-Pseudolikelihood

Yes

Yes

Yes

13,064

13,064

13,064

-4831.37

-4825.29

-4825.29

While the empirical pattern demonstrated in column (10) of Table V offers
support for the hypothesis that analysts are punished for sticking to their incorrect out-ofconsensus views, it is interesting to ask whether these punishments still arise when an
analyst’s out-of-consensus views are initially incorrect but are eventually revealed to be
correct at a later point in time. Although the stubbornness we have documented reduces
forecasting accuracy on average, there are certainly occasions when an analyst makes an
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out-of-consensus forecast, stubbornly maintains her view on a firm despite initial
indications that her view was incorrect, and gains ultimate vindication because her view
turns out to be correct in the long run. As discussed previously, if the rewards on these
occasions are sufficiently large (and if the punishment for sticking with a view that
ultimately proves incorrect is relatively small), analysts may sometimes “swing for the
fences” with their predictions, maintaining views that have only a small probability of
being correct. To explore this possibility, the regression presented in column (11) of
Table V adds the explanatory variable AVG_ERROR, which is the mean of ERROR
(defined in Section III) over all observations for a given analyst in a given year (see
Appendix B for summary statistics). The variable AVG_ERROR captures the accuracy of
the long-horizon (yearly) forecasts that the analyst publishes after learning about the
accuracy of her short-horizon (quarterly) forecasts. In addition, we add two other control
variables. Because the variable %INCORRECT_STUB simultaneously captures both
whether or not an analyst updates her forecasts stubbornly when her quarterly estimate is
incorrect and the number of instances in which her quarterly estimate is incorrect, we
construct a control variable to measure the average extent to which an analyst’s quarterly
estimates are incorrect. The variable %INCORRECT_DEV is defined as the percentage
of the time that an analyst’s quarterly forecast differs from the consensus forecast in the
wrong direction relative to an earnings surprise. For the sake of symmetry, we also
define a variable – %CORRECT_DEV – as the percentage of the time that an analyst’s
quarterly forecast differs from the consensus forecast in the right direction relative to an
earnings surprise. As reported in column (11) of Table V, the coefficient on
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AVG_ERROR indicates that analysts with greater long-horizon accuracy are indeed more
likely to receive greater recognition from Institutional Investor. In addition, the
coefficients on %INCORRECT_DEV and %CORRECT_DEV are both positive and
significant, suggesting that being an extremist can be rewarding. However, the
coefficient on %INCORRECT_STUB remains negative.
To further explore the possibility that analysts have an incentive to “swing for the
fences,” we break out the variable %INCORRECT_STUB into two pieces:
%INCORRECT_STUB_SUC and %INCORRECT_STUB_FAIL. The variable
%INCORRECT_STUB_SUC is defined as the fraction of quarterly earnings forecasts
issued by a given analyst during a given year that satisfy three criteria: (i) the quarterly
forecast differed from the consensus forecast in the direction opposite from reported
earnings per share; (ii) the analyst adjusted her forecast for the remaining quarters of the
fiscal year by less in the direction of the earnings surprise than the hypothetical
benchmark used in the definition of %INCORRECT_STUB; and (iii) the analyst’s
forecast for the remaining quarters of the fiscal year was more accurate than the forecast
implied by the hypothetical benchmark update. The variable
%INCORRECT_STUB_FAIL is defined similarly, except criterion (iii) is that the
analyst’s forecast for the remaining quarters of the fiscal year was less accurate than the
forecast implied by the hypothetical benchmark update. Note that these two new
variables sum to %INCORRECT_STUB. As shown in column (12) of Table V, when we
replace %INCORRECT_STUB with these two variables, the point estimate for the
coefficient on %INCORRECT_STUB_SUC is essentially the same as the point estimate
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for the coefficient on %INCORRECT_STUB_FAIL, suggesting that “swinging for the
fences” is punished even when doing so improves accuracy.
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that analysts are punished for stubbornly
updating their subsequent earnings forecasts when their out-of-consensus quarterly
forecasts prove incorrect. These results cast doubt on the possibility that the
stubbornness documented in Section IV is a response to compensation-related or careerrelated incentives. Of course, the analyses we have presented here are primarily
exploratory in nature.
VI. Conclusion
We find that when a stock analyst makes an extreme earnings forecast that a
future earnings announcement reveals was incorrect, she sticks stubbornly to her opinion
rather than updating as much as analysts whose estimates were closer to consensus.
Furthermore, this type of behavior is harmful to analysts’ forecasting accuracy on
average. We explore potential explanations for this behavior, and the available evidence
indicates that analysts are punished for digging in their heels when they make incorrect
extreme earnings forecasts, suggesting that this behavior is not a response to
compensation-related or career-related incentives.
These results deepen our understanding of the factors that contribute to market
participants’ errors in predicting the future performance of assets. Insofar as the pattern
of escalation we detect is indicative of a broader pattern of stubbornness in the updating
behavior of investors, our findings suggest a channel through which securities may be
mispriced relative to fundamentals for extended periods of time. Of course, one
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limitation of our analysis is that it does not directly assess the implications of our results
for asset prices, so an investigation of the degree to which escalation affects market
prices would be an interesting direction for future research. It may also be productive to
extend this line of inquiry from equity markets to credit markets, as recent
macroeconomic events have revealed forecasting mistakes in the latter context to be
particularly disruptive to economic activity.
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions
Primary Analyses
•

Variable Used in Definitions: YepsEaftpre
Description: The EPS estimate issued by analyst a for firm f that applies to the fiscal year
containing quarter t and that was published immediately preceding the announcement of
earnings for quarter t, divided by the per-share price of company f stock at the end of the
prior fiscal year.

•

Variable Used in Definitions: YepsEaftpost
Description: The EPS estimate issued by analyst a for firm f that applies to the fiscal year
containing quarter t and that was published immediately following the announcement of
earnings for quarter t, divided by the per-share price of company f stock at the end of the
prior fiscal year.

•

Variable Used in Definitions: YepsAft
Description: The actual earnings per share reported by firm f for the fiscal year including
quarter t, divided by the per-share price of company f stock at the end of the prior fiscal year.

•

Variable Used in Definitions: QepsEaftpre
Description: The EPS estimate issued by analyst a for firm f that applies to quarter t and that
was published immediately preceding the announcement of earnings for quarter t, divided by
the per-share price of company f stock at the end of the prior fiscal year.

•

Variable Used in Definitions: QepsAft
Description: The actual earnings per share reported by firm f for quarter t, divided by the
per-share price of company f stock at the end of the prior fiscal year.

•

Variable Used in Definitions: median _ QepsE ftpre
Description: The median of the price-per-share adjusted EPS estimates issued by all analysts
covering firm f that applied to quarter t and that were published immediately preceding the
announcement of earnings for quarter t.

•

Variable Used in Definitions: stddev _ QepsE ftpre
Description: The standard deviation of the price-per-share adjusted EPS estimates issued by
all analysts covering firm f that applied to quarter t and that were published immediately
preceding the announcement of earnings for quarter t.

•

Variable Used in Analyses: UPDATEaft
Description: The magnitude of an analyst’s update to her forecast of EPS for the fiscal year
in response to a quarterly earnings announcement. Specifically, this variable captures the
size of an analyst a’s adjustment to her EPS estimate for a firm f’s fiscal year containing
quarter t in response to the announcement of firm f’s actual earnings for quarter t. This
variable’s value is increasing as an analyst updates her estimate more in the direction of the
quarterly earnings surprise, where the quarterly earnings surprise is measured relative to the
median analyst estimate.
(YepsE aftpost − YepsE aftpre ) if QepsA ft > median _ QepsE ftpre
Definition:
(YepsE aftpre − YepsE aftpost )
otherwise

•

Variable Used in Analyses: EPS_SURPRISEaft
Description: The amount by which an analyst misforecasted a firm’s quarterly EPS.
Specifically, this variable measures how far off analyst a’s EPS estimate is from firm f’s
actual EPS for quarter t. This variable’s value is increasing as an analyst’s quarterly EPS
estimate differs from actual EPS by a larger amount in the same direction that the median
analyst EPS estimate differs from actual EPS.
(QepsA ft − QepsEaftpre ) if QepsA ft > median _ QepsE ftpre
Definition:
(QepsEaftpre − QepsA ft )
otherwise

•

Variable Used in Analyses: INCORRECT_DEVaft
Description: The magnitude of an analyst’s incorrect extremism. Specifically, this variable
is the maximum of zero and the number of standard deviations separating an analyst’s
quarterly EPS estimate from the median quarterly EPS estimate if the analyst’s estimate is off
from the median estimate in the wrong direction relative to the earnings surprise.
median _ QepsE ftpre − QepsEaftpre
max 0,
if QepsA ft > median _ QepsE ftpre
pre
stddev _ QepsE ft
Definition:
QepsEaftpre − median _ QepsE ftpre
max 0,
otherwise
stddev _ QepsE ftpre

•

Variable Used in Analyses: CORRECT_DEVaft
Description: The magnitude of an analyst’s correct extremism. Specifically, this variable is
the maximum of zero and the number of standard deviations separating an analyst’s quarterly
EPS estimate from the median quarterly EPS estimate if the analyst’s estimate is off from the
median estimate in the right direction relative to the earnings surprise.
max 0,

Definition:
max 0,

QepsE aftpre − median _ QepsE ftpre
stddev _ QepsE

pre
ft

median _ QepsE ftpre − QepsE aftpre
stddev _ QepsE ftpre

if

QepsA ft > median _ QepsE ftpre
otherwise

•

Variable Used in Analyses: ERRORaft
Description: The error in an analyst’s adjusted yearly EPS estimate, which is the absolute
difference between analyst a’s new stock-price-normalized yearly EPS estimate following
firm f’s quarter t earnings announcement and the actual stock-price-normalized yearly EPS
announced by firm f.
Definition: YepsA ft − YepsE aftpost

•

Variable Used in Analyses: HYP_ERRORaft
Description: The error in an analyst’s hypothetical adjusted yearly EPS estimate in a world
without stubbornness. We calculate the product of analyst a’s degree of incorrect extremism
and her EPS surprise for firm f and quarter t, and we multiply this product by the coefficient
on the appropriate interaction term in column (1) of Table II. Then, this “average
stubbornness” quantity is removed from an analyst’s actual forecast. Finally, we calculate
the absolute difference between this hypothetical forecast and the actual stock-pricenormalized yearly EPS announced by firm f.
Definition:
YepsA ft − (YepsE aftpost − βˆ 4 * INCORRECT _ DEV aft * EPS _ SURPRISE

aft

)

YepsA ft − (YepsE aftpost + βˆ 4 * INCORRECT _ DEV aft * EPS _ SURPRISE

aft

)

if

QepsA ft > median _ QepsE
otherwise

Analyses Presented in Discussion
•

Variable Used in Definitions: benchmark_updateaft
Description: A hypothetical benchmark update that is intended to capture what typical
forecast updates would look like if all analysts responded to earnings surprises in the same
way as analysts with quarterly estimates at the consensus. We perform the regression
presented in column (1) of Table II using the subset of analysts who are included in our II
data set. We use the coefficient estimates from this regression to predict the value of the
variable UPDATE according to the regression equation presented in Section IV.A, except we
set the coefficients on the two interaction terms ( 4 and 5) to zero.
βˆ EPS _ SURPRISE aft + βˆ 2 INCORRECT _ DEVaft + βˆ 3 CORRECT _ DEVaft
Definition: 1
+ βˆ 6 Q1 _ dummy t + βˆ 7 Q 2 _ dummyt + αˆ af

•

Variable Used in Definitions: benchmark _ YepsEaftpost
Description: A hypothetical benchmark forecast that is intended to capture what an analyst’s
updated forecast would look like if all analysts responded to earnings surprises with a
benchmark update as described in the previous definition.
(YepsEaftpre + benchmark _ updateaft ) if QepsA ft > median _ QepsE ftpre
Definition:
(YepsEaftpre − benchmark _ updateaft )
otherwise

pre
ft

•

Variable Used in Analyses: award_levelay
Description: A variable that takes on integer values ranging from 0 to 4 indicating the level
of “All-American” recognition analyst a achieved from Institutional Investor magazine in
year y. If an analyst was named a first team All-American, this variable takes on a value of
4; if an analyst was named a second team All-American, it takes on a value of 3; if an analyst
was named a third team All-American, it takes on a value of 2; if an analyst was named a
runner-up All-American, it takes on a value of 1; and if an analyst received no award, it takes
on a value of 0.

•

Variable Used in Analyses: %INCORRECT_DEVay
Description: A measure of how often an analyst exhibited incorrect extremism. This
variable is equal to the percentage of analyst a’s quarterly EPS forecasts in year y that differ
from the median forecast in the wrong direction relative to an earnings surprise.
I [ INCORRECT _ DEVaft > 0])
f
t∈S ( y )
Definition16:
1
f
t∈S ( y )

•

Variable Used in Analyses: %CORRECT_DEVay
Description: A measure of how often an analyst exhibited correct extremism. This variable
is equal to the percentage of analyst a’s quarterly EPS forecasts in year y that differ from the
median forecast in the right direction relative to an earnings surprise.
I [CORRECT _ DEVaft > 0])
f
t∈S ( y )
Definition:
1
f
t∈S ( y )

•

Variable Used in Analyses: %INCORRECT_STUBay
Description: A measure of how often an analyst exhibited stubbornness in updating when
her estimate deviated from the median estimate in the wrong direction relative to the earnings
surprise. This variable is equal to the proportion of analyst a’s updates in response to an
earnings announcement during year y that involved less adjustment in the direction of the
earnings surprise than the hypothetical benchmark defined above and that involved a
situation where the analyst’s estimate of quarterly earnings deviated from the median
estimate in the opposite direction as announced earnings.
I [ INCORRECT _ DEV aft > 0 & benchmark _ update aft > UPDATE aft ]
f
t∈S ( y )
Definition:
1
f
t∈S ( y )

16

S(y) is the set of all time periods t with end dates that fall within the year-long (July 1 to June 30) period y.

•

Variable Used in Analyses: %CORRECT_STUBay
Description: A measure of how often an analyst exhibited stubbornness in updating when
her estimate deviated from the median estimate in the right direction relative to the earnings
surprise. This variable is equal to the proportion of analyst a’s updates in response to an
earnings announcement during year y that involved less adjustment in the direction of the
earnings surprise than the hypothetical benchmark defined above and that involved a
situation where the analyst’s estimate of quarterly earnings deviated from the median
estimate in the same direction as announced earnings.
Definition:

f

t∈S ( y )

I [CORRECT _ DEVaft > 0 & benchmark _ updateaft > UPDATE aft ]
t∈S ( y )

f

1

•

Variable Used in Analyses: AVG_ERRORay
Description: A measure of an analyst’s average forecasting error. This variable is equal to
the average absolute difference between an analyst’s updated stock-price-normalized forecast
for a firm’s fiscal year EPS following a quarterly earnings announcement and the firm’s
actual stock-price-normalized yearly EPS.
ERRORaft
f
t∈S ( y )
Definition:
1
f
t∈S ( y )

•

Variable Used in Analyses: %INCORRECT_STUB_SUCay
Description: A measure of how often an analyst exhibited stubbornness in updating that
eventually proved correct when her estimate deviated from the median estimate in the wrong
direction relative to the earnings surprise. This variable is equal to the proportion of an
analyst’s yearly estimates that were more accurate than the benchmark estimate described
above and for which the analyst’s quarterly earnings estimate deviated from the median
estimate in the opposite direction from the earnings surprise and the analyst updated less in
the direction of this surprise than the benchmark update defined above.
f

Definition:

I
t∈S ( y )

INCORRECT _ DEVaft > 0 & benchmark _ updateaft > UPDATE aft &
ERRORaft < YepsA ft − benchmark _ YepsEaftpost
f

t∈S ( y )

1

•

Variable Used in Analyses: %INCORRECT_STUB_FAILay
Description: A measure of how often an analyst exhibited stubbornness in updating that
eventually proved incorrect when her estimate deviated from the median estimate in the
wrong direction relative to the earnings surprise. This variable is equal to the proportion of
an analyst’s yearly estimates that were less accurate than the benchmark estimate described
above and for which the analyst’s quarterly earnings estimate deviated from the median
estimate in the opposite direction from the earnings surprise and the analyst updated less in
the direction of this surprise than the benchmark update defined above.
f

Definition:

I
t∈S ( y )

INCORRECT _ DEVaft > 0 & benchmark _ updateaft > UPDATE aft &
ERRORaft > YepsA ft − benchmark _ YepsEaftpost
f

t∈S ( y )

1

Appendix B. The Construction of Our Analyst Rewards Data Set

The data we use to measure analyst rewards come from Institutional Investor (II)
magazine. Each year, Institutional Investor magazine names an All-American Research Team.
For each of the 75 market sectors identified by Institutional Investor (e.g., Airlines, Beverages,
Computer Services, etc.), the magazine annually names a first place, second place, and third
place analyst as well as one or more runner-up analysts. The II rankings are based on the results
of a survey that the magazine conducts each year of “the directors of research and chief
investment officers of major money management firms”.17
We gather data on the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team rankings
published between 1998 and 2007, which are made available on the magazine’s website. This
data set includes rankings of 3,774 analysts, 3,415 of whom cover stocks rather than making
forecasts about macroeconomic conditions. Because the EPS forecasting data provided by
I/B/E/S only identify analysts and their brokerage houses with unique, anonymous ID’s, we
create an algorithm to match the names of II winners with I/B/E/S analyst ID’s. In the first stage
of our matching algorithm, we rely on FirstCall analyst estimate data to de-anonymize the
brokerage houses in our I/B/E/S data set. FirstCall lists the names of brokerage houses along
with analysts’ EPS forecasts.18 We identify the brokerage house that corresponds to a broker ID
in I/B/E/S by looking at the number of times an EPS estimate for a given company on a given
date in the FirstCall database matches an EPS estimate for the same company on the same date in
the I/B/E/S database. When at least 90% of such matches for a given FirstCall brokerage house
correspond to a given broker ID in I/B/E/S and we have more than 100 observations of estimates

17

See www.iimagazine.com (accessed April 23, 2008).
We rely on I/B/E/S and not FirstCall as the source of our EPS estimates data because fewer analysts are included
in the FirstCall data set than in the I/B/E/S data set. This more limited sample would give us a less accurate measure
of consensus estimates about a stock.
18

by analysts from that brokerage house in our FirstCall data, we assume we have identified the
brokerage house in question in our I/B/E/S data set. This method allows us to identify the name
of the brokerage house associated with 204 of the 432 broker ID’s in our I/B/E/S data. We
restrict our analyses of analyst rewards to include only analysts working for this subset of
brokerage houses, which reduces the number of II award winners in our data set to 1,678. Note
that when we use only the subset of data from the 204 brokerage houses we are able to identify
and re-run our primary analyses to investigate whether analysts who have made incorrect
extreme EPS forecasts are more stubborn than others and whether this is harmful to analysts’
accuracy, our results do not change meaningfully.
The next stage of our algorithm designed to match I/B/E/S analyst ID’s with II award
winners is as follows. We begin by collecting I/B/E/S Recommendations data, which include
data on the first initials and last names of analysts along with the stocks they cover at a given
point in time. We then match the first initial and last name of each II winner with the first initial
and last name of an analyst in the I/B/E/S Recommendations data to find the list of stocks that a
given II winner covers. For the small number of Institutional Investor winners whose names do
not appear in the I/B/E/S Recommendations data, we find the names of one to three stocks the
analyst covers manually using the internet. We then match the names of analysts who won II
awards with Analyst ID’s in our I/B/E/S EPS data set based on the stocks they cover and the
brokerage houses they work for.19 This algorithm allows us to identify an analyst in our I/B/E/S
EPS data set who we believe corresponds to an II award winner for 99% of the II award winners
at the 204 brokerage houses we are able to identify between 1998 and 2007.

19

For a more detailed explanation of this matching methodology, see Appendix C.

Having constructed a dataset containing information about which analysts received which
II awards in a given year, we create a number of variables to use in our analysis, as described in
Section V. We define a year leading up to an announcement of the Institutional Investor awards,
which are published in II magazine’s September issue, as the twelve-month period ending on
July 1st of the year the II rankings in question are published. Because our ordered logit
regressions presented in Table V control for four dummy variables indicating whether an analyst
was ranked first, second, third, or runner-up in the previous year’s II ranking list, we exclude
observations from all years prior to 1999 from our final data set. In the end, our analyst-year
data set includes 13,064 observations of the behavior and performance of 4,212 analysts over 9
years. Table B.I presents summary statistics for the variables.
Table B.I
Summary statistics from our analyst-year Institutional Investor
data set.
award_level
%INCORRECT_STUB
%CORRECT_STUB
%INCORRECT_DEV
%CORRECT_DEV
AVG_ERROR
%INCORRECT_STUB_SUC
%INCORRECT_STUB_FAIL
ranked_1st_previous_yearay

Mean
Std. Dev.
0.28575
0.85540
0.21974
0.27816
0.13765
0.22038
0.30841
0.30753
0.31748
0.30924
0.00488
0.00731
0.10699
0.20581
0.11275
0.21546
0.02549

0.15761

nd

0.02449

0.15459

rd

0.02411

0.15340

0.04876

0.21537

ranked_2 _previous_yearay
ranked_3 _previous_yearay
runner-up_previous_yearay

(N =13,064)

Appendix C. Method for Matching Analyst ID’s in I/B/E/S Estimates Data with Analyst
Names in List of Institutional Investor Award Winners
Step 1: In the I/B/E/S Estimates data and list of Institutional Investor award winners, drop all
analysts who work for brokerage houses that we were not able to identify using FirstCall. In the
list of II award winners, drop all analysts who forecast macroeconomic conditions instead of
covering individual stocks.
Step 2: Match names in the list of Institutional Investor award winners to names in the I/B/E/S
Recommendations data. This gives us a list of stocks covered by a given analyst in the II list
during a given year. For each analyst in the II list who cannot be matched to the I/B/E/S
Recommendations data, find 1-3 stocks covered by the analyst manually.
Step 3: For each Institutional Investor winner in each year, find the observations in the I/B/E/S
Estimates data that match the winner’s brokerage house (identified using FirstCall data, as
described in Appendix B), the year, and one of the stocks covered by the winner (identified in
Step 2). Each of these observations is associated with an I/B/E/S Analyst ID. Define an Analyst
ID’s “ratio” as the proportion of observations matched to the II winner in that year that are
associated with that Analyst ID. If there are multiple Analyst ID’s that could be assigned to the
same II winner in a given year, choose the one with the highest value for “ratio.”
Step 4: If the same analyst is assigned different I/B/E/S Analyst ID’s in different years, sort the
data set by analyst and year, and for each analyst apply the following rules in order:

a. If

Analyst ID for year ‘y’ does not match Analyst ID for year ‘y-1’
Analyst ID for year ‘y’ does not match Analyst ID for year ‘y+1’
Analyst ID for year ‘y-1’ matches Analyst ID for year ‘y+1’
Analyst ID for year ‘y-1’ has a ratio greater than 0.8 and at least 10 matched
observations and
v. Analyst ID for year ‘y+1’ has a ratio greater than 0.8 and at least 10 matched
observations
Then replace Analyst ID for year ‘y’ with Analyst ID for year ‘y-1’/year ‘y+1’ [Note:
‘y-1’ and ‘y+1’ can be interpreted as ‘y-2’ and ‘y+2’]

b. If

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

i. The analyst switches firms
ii. Analyst ID for the last year at the old firm does not match Analyst ID for any
prior years at the old firm
iii. Analyst ID matches for all prior years at the old firm
iv. Analyst ID for the last year at the old firm has a ratio lower than 0.8 or a
number of matched observations less than 10 and
v. Analyst ID for at least one prior year at the old firm has a ratio greater than
0.8 and at least 10 matched observations

Then replace Analyst ID for the last year at the old firm with Analyst ID for prior
years at the old firm
c. If

i. The analyst switches firms
ii. Analyst ID for the first year at the new firm does not match Analyst ID for
any subsequent years at the new firm
iii. Analyst ID matches for all subsequent years at the new firm
iv. Analyst ID for the first year at the new firm has a ratio lower than 0.8 or a
number of matched observations less than 10 and
v. Analyst ID for at least one subsequent year at the new firm has a ratio greater
than 0.8 and at least 10 matched observations
Then replace Analyst ID for the first year at the new firm with Analyst ID for
subsequent years at the new firm

d. If

i. Analyst ID in the first year the analyst appears in II does not match Analyst
ID for any subsequent years the analyst appears in II
ii. Analyst ID matches for all subsequent years the analyst appears in II
iii. Analyst ID in the first year the analyst appears in II has a ratio lower than 0.8
or a number of matched observations less than 10 and
iv. Analyst ID for at least one subsequent year the analyst appears in II has a ratio
greater than 0.8 and at least 10 matched observations
Then replace Analyst ID in the first year with Analyst ID in subsequent years

e. If

i. Analyst ID in the last year the analyst appears in II does not match Analyst ID
for any prior years the analyst appears in II
ii. Analyst ID matches for all prior years the analyst appears in II
iii. Analyst ID in the last year the analyst appears in II has a ratio lower than 0.8
or a number of matched observations less than 10 and
iv. Analyst ID for at least one prior year the analyst appears in II has a ratio
greater than 0.8 and at least 10 matched observations
Then replace Analyst ID in the last year with Analyst ID in prior years

f. If

i. Analyst ID in all years up to and including ‘y’ where the analyst appears in II
matches
ii. Analyst ID in all years from ‘y+1’ forward where the analyst appears in II
matches
iii. Analyst ID in at least one of the years up to and including ‘y’ where the
analyst appears in II has a ratio greater than 0.8 and at least 10 matched
observations and
iv. Analyst ID in at least one of the years from ‘y+1’ forward where the analyst
appears in II has a ratio greater than 0.8 and at least 10 matched observations
Then the analyst is deemed to have had a change in Analyst ID

g. If

i. One Analyst ID has a ratio greater than 0.8 and at least 10 matched
observations and
ii. No other Analyst ID has this property
Then the Analyst ID with a ratio greater than 0.8 and at least 10 matched observations
applies to all years that the analyst appears in II

h. If more than one Analyst ID or no Analyst ID has a ratio greater than 0.8 and at least
10 matched observations
Then the Analyst ID with the highest cumulative number of matched observations
applies to all years that the analyst appears in II
Step 5: If there is an analyst and year for which no Analyst ID is assigned, use the Analyst ID
that applies to that analyst in other years, provided that the analyst does not switch firms.
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